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1 Introduction
The agricultural household model forms the foundation of our understanding of household
decision-making in agricultural societies, particularly in the developing world. 1 One common
feature of models of this type is that household production may involve labor inputs from varied
sources. For example, in the presence of labor markets, the farm production function may take
hired as well as family labor as inputs; when labor markets are imperfect or altogether absent,
the distinction may be made between male and female labor or adult and child labor within the
family.
The way in which multiple labor inputs interact in the farm and off-farm production func-
tions can be an important determinant of the predictions made by these model for the behavior
of household members. The complementarity or substitutability of family labor in production
affects the household’s optimal allocation of resources (notably time allocations) as well as the
way household members adjust to shocks. Complementarities may arise, for example, if adults
can monitor children on the farm when they work together, or if males and females specialize
in different aspects of the production process. The extent of substitutability of labor across sub-
groups of family members may depend on their physical endowments; their traditional roles in
household production; or their farm- or home-specific human capital.
Despite this central role, however, there is little theoretical or empirical consensus on the
nature of this interaction. For example, it has often been assumed that male and female labor
inputs within the family are (imperfect) substitutes (Mark Rosenzweig 1980; Hanan Jacoby 1993;
Michael Baker and Dwayne Benjamin 1997). As regards adult and child labor, some studies
have assumed complementarity (e.g. Rosenzweig and Kenneth Wolpin 1985), while others have
assumed separability of the two inputs (e.g. Jean-Marie Baland and James Robinson 2000). Still
others have restricted the properties of the family production function in a way which implies
either substitutability or complementarity (e.g. Pierre-Andre Chiappori 1997).2
The purpose of our study is to derive a test of the complementarity or substitutability of
family labor in household production. To our knowledge, the only other study which has at-
tempted to do this is by Thomas Kniesner (1976), whose test is important as a first attempt but
is methodologically flawed.3 The present study is different in several ways. First, it studies
1See Inderjit Singh, Lyn Squire and John Strauss (1986) for a survey of the classic models, and J. Edward Taylor
and Irma Adelman (2003) for a synthesis of the more recent literature.
2A large literature has examined the related issue of the substitutability of family and hired labor (a classic ex-
ample is Benjamin (1992)). We do not address this literature here because the distinction between hired and family
labor is only relevant to contexts in which labor markets are complete, whereas in our data labor markets are largely
nonexistent.
3Knieser’s (1976) test is based on comparing estimates of the effect of the wife’s wage on the husband’s market la-
bor time for two sub-samples of the National Longitudinal Survey: husband-wife pairs in which the wife works, and
pairs in which the wife does not work. He instruments for the wife’s wage using a vector of the wife’s demographic
characteristics. The study’s methods are flawed in at least two aspects. First, in order to derive the cross-price elastic-
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agricultural households in a developing country context, for whom the question of complemen-
tarity or substitutability of labor has not, to our knowledge, been tested. Second, we need not
rely on any assumptions on the cross-price elasticities of labor across family members. Third,
since the effective nonexistence of labor markets in our setting renders moot the issue of shift-
ing household member-specific wages, we rely instead on shifting the closest analogs, i.e., the
marginal productivities of farm and non-farm labor.
In particular, we focus on introducing health (and acute shocks to health) into a model of
intra-household allocations. In our model, two household members provide labor inputs in
two sectors of production - farm and off-farm work. Health enters directly into each individ-
ual’s utility, and also affects the marginal productivity of labor in both sectors. Under minimal
assumptions on the household decision-making process, we are able to derive a test of the com-
plementarity or substitutability of family labor in the farm and non-farm production functions.
The test exploits the empirically observed patterns of labor adjustment within the household in
response to health shocks.
We estimate the pattern of labor adjustment using an instrument for the healthcare choices
of sick individuals in the household. We propose that the choice of higher quality healthcare
in response to acute illness results in a faster recovery, generating shifts in individuals’ health.
Accordingly, we first verify that using formal-sector care does indeed improve health outcomes
for acutely sick individuals (akin to the results in Achyuta Adhvaryu and Anant Nyshadham
(2010a, 2010b)).
We then estimate the labor supply responses of sick and non-sick household members. Our
estimates reject the substitutability of family labor in farm and non-farm production, and instead
imply that complementarities must exist in at least one sector of production. In particular, we find
that sick and non-sick household members both shift labor away from non-farm and towards
farm labor when the sick recover more quickly. The bulk of the adjustment takes place in labor
on the household’s own farm and in self-employment. Infra-marginal adjustments across types
of farming activities provide further evidence of farm-specific complementarities: we find that
when sick individuals recover, both sick and non-sick household members shift away from crop
maintenance (weeding, pruning, etc.) and into land preparation and harvesting activities. In the
appendix, we examine heterogeneous effects across gender and ages (children versus adults) in
the household.
Understanding the way that labor inputs interact in household production may inform a di-
verse set of economic questions, from household adjustments following productivity or produc-
tion technology shocks (Anjini Kochar 1995, 1999; Kathleen Beegle, Rajeev Dehejia and Roberta
ity of male market time with respect to the female wage, the test relies critically on assuming the sign of the opposite
cross-price elasticity (female market time with respect to the male wage). Second, the validity of the exclusion re-
strictions for the instruments for wife’s wages is tenuous: the wife’s schooling, race and number of children are all
likely related to the husband’s labor supply through channels outside of the wife’s wage.
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Gatti 2006); to schooling-child labor decisions (Mette Ejrnæs and Claus Po¨rtner 2004; Eric Ed-
monds 2006); to the relationship between family labor supply and fertility (especially concern-
ing pregnancy and childcare) (T. Paul Schultz 1990); to labor market effects of household health
shocks (Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Adam Wagstaff 2007); to optimal sorting in the marriage
market (Jere Behrman et al. 1994).
Our study also contributes to a large body of literature examining the role of health in intra-
household resource allocations. Our results, building on work by Mark Pitt et. al (1990), Schultz
(1990) and others, suggest that the health of household members–in addition to affecting bar-
gaining power (Schultz 2001), consumption demand (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1985; Pitt et al. 2006)
and household income (Schultz and Aysit Tansel 1997)–can have large effects on the time allo-
cation decisions of sick as well as healthy household members through production complemen-
tarities.
Finally, the findings of this study may be relevant in setting labor-market and health-related
policies, as well. First, we estimate the intra-household spillover effects of treatment for acute
illness; recent studies have focused in general on the spillovers of treatment for longer-term
health conditions (e.g. Giovanna d’Adda et al. 2009; Joshua Graff Zivin et al. 2009). Our results
suggest that making transport to health facilities cheaper, or investing in health infrastructure
in remote areas, improves not only health outcomes, but also has effects on the time allocations
of the sick individual as well as the other members of his household. Second, our results on pro-
duction complementarities are not contingent on this health-related context; thus, the insights
gained here regarding intra-household adjustments may be applied to any policy which affects
the labor supply or underlying productivity of particular household members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
our main test of labor complementarities. Section 3 describes our data set and construction of
important variables. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy and discusses its validity. Section
5 presents the main results of our test. Section 6 discusses the validity of alternative explanations
to the results. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We study a collective household model in which two household members divide their time
between leisure and two types of productive activity: farm and non-farm labor. We use the
model to characterize household behavior in the face of health shocks, focusing in particular
on labor allocations within the household. We show that the pattern of adjustment of labor
allocations across sectors and household members depends crucially on the complementarity
or substitutability of household labor in the farm and non-farm production functions. Finally,
we show how data on labor allocations, health shocks and corresponding treatment choices can
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be used to formulate an empirical test for the presence of labor complementarities in production.
2.1 Setup
Consider a household with two members i ∈ {1, 2}. Let Ω be the individual time endowment;
each household member’s time is allocated toward leisure Li; labor on one’s own farm (l
f
i );
outside agricultural wage labor (lwi ) at wage rate w; and non-farm labor (ti). The time constraint
for each i is therefore Ω = Li + l
f
i + l
w
i + ti. Individuals value their own consumption of the
two market goods (ci = (c
f
i , c
n
i )), own leisure (Li), own health hi, and the health and leisure of
the other family member, h−i and L−i respectively. Each member’s preferences are represented
by a utility function ui(ci, Li, L−i, hi, h−i).4 Goods are produced via the production functions
for farm and non-farm labor, f(lf1 , l
f
2 , l
h, h1, h2) and n(t1, t2, h1, h2), respectively, where lh is the
total hired labor on the household’s farm. The market prices of the two goods are p = (pf , pn).
We assume that wage labor exists in the farm sector, but that non-farm labor time is non-
marketable. Suppose further that the amount of outside agricultural wage labor (lwi ) is con-
strained such that for each i the quantity of such labor cannot exceed Mi. These assumptions
are in keeping with our empirical context, as well as other agricultural settings in the develop-
ing world (Udry 1996; Fafchamps 1993). In our sample, though the average number of hours
spent farming per week by a member of a household with at least one sick and one non-sick
member is roughly 14.5, less than .5 of these hours is spent working on someone else’s farm for
a wage. This evidence confirms that, while a market for farm labor exists, participation in this
market is constrained to low levels.
Health enters the household allocation problem in two ways. First, it directly provides util-
ity, as described above. Second, it affects each household member’s productivity. We make only
one restriction on the way in which hi enters f and n: we assume that the health of person i does
not directly affect the marginal productivity of person −i. That is, ∂2f
∂lf−i∂hi
= 0 and ∂
2n
∂t−i∂hi = 0.
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Of course, the marginal productivity of −i in each sector is still free to shift as a result of labor
adjustments to an acute health shock to i.
Our focus in this paper is on acute health shocks and corresponding (acute) investments
in treatment for these shocks. Accordingly, we define the health production function as hi =
h(σiQi, εi), where σi ∈ {0, 1} is an acute health shock indicator,Qi is the corresponding intensity
of treatment (which we think of as the quality of healthcare for individual i), and εi is a vector
of other inputs into health, such as endowments, long-term care, chronic illness etc. The price
4Note that we allow explicitly for non-separability of leisure and health across household members. The results
of the model are also robust to considering a fully non-separable utility function within a unitary representation
of the household’s problem. We choose to focus on the collective model in keeping with the recent literature on
intra-household decision-making in developing countries.
5One way in which this assumption may be violated is through disease contagion; we address this possibility in
section 6.
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of one unit of Qi is pQ. Note that as we have defined the health production function above, Qi
only improves health in the event of a health shock (i.e. when σi = 1). We restrict Qi in this way
to underscore its role as curative care, rather than long-term health investment, preventative care
or the like. We return to this restriction in our discussion of the empirical strategy in section 4.
2.2 Utility maximization
An efficient allocation of resources within the household is characterized as a solution to the
following problem:6
maxci,Li,lfi ,lwi ,lh,ti,Qi: i∈{1,2}
u1(c1, L1, L2, h1, h2) + Φu2(c2, L1, L2, h1, h2) subject to
p · (c1 + c2) + pQ(Q1 +Q2) ≤ pff(lf1 , lf2 , lh, h1, h2) + w(lw1 + lw2 − lh) + pnn(t1, t2, h1, h2) (1)
Li + l
f
i + l
w
i + ti = Ωi, i ∈ {1, 2} (2)
lwi ≤Mi, i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
hi = h(σiQi, εi), i ∈ {1, 2} (4)
We make the following standard assumptions about the shapes of the utilities and produc-
tion functions:
1. Utility is increasing and concave in own consumption: ∂ui
∂cfi
, ∂ui
∂chi
> 0 and ∂
2ui
∂cfi
2 ,
∂2ui
∂chi
2 < 0, for
i = 1, 2.
2. Consumption goods are normal.
3. The production functions are increasing and concave in their labor inputs: ∂n∂ti ,
∂f
∂lfi
> 0 and
∂2n
∂t2i
, ∂
2f
∂lfi
2 < 0 for i = 1, 2; and
∂f
∂lh
> 0 and ∂
2f
∂lh2
< 0.
Under the above assumptions, in the unconstrained case (in which the agricultural wage
labor constraints do not bind), we obtain interior solutions for consumption demand, labor
supply and healthcare quality choice as functions of the model’s parameters.7 However, as
noted above, frictions do exist in the agricultural labor market in our context, and thus the
salient case is the one in which the constraint binds, i.e. when lwi = Mi and l
h = 0. In this case,
6Ours is a simple variant of the basic constrained optimization problem of the agricultural household, described,
for example, in Bardhan and Udry (1999). We modify the model to include multiple sectors, multiple household
members and a role for health. For similar characterizations of the collective household as they apply to the devel-
oping country context, see, e.g, Chiappori (1992, 1997), Udry (1996), Duflo and Udry (2004).
7We show in appendix section A.1 that in the unconstrained case, in which the agricultural wage labor constraints
do not bind, we are able to derive the same test of complementarities as in the constrained case.
6
the budget constraint becomes:
p · (c1 + c2) + pQ(Q1 +Q2) ≤ pff(lf1 , lf2 , 0, h1, h2) + w(M1 +M2) + pnn(t1, t2, h1, h2) (5)
We focus on two of the necessary first order conditions–those with respect to lf2 and t2, the
own farm and non-farm labor contributions of the second household member. We do this to
draw attention to the intra-household consequences of health shocks and their corresponding
treatment, as below, we examine the case in which household member 1 experiences a health
shock but household member 2 does not. The first order conditions for these two choice vari-
ables are as follows (letting λ and δ denote the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint
and the time constraint, respectively):
(lf2 ) : −λ
(
−pf ∂f
∂lf2
)
− δ = 0 (6)
(t2) : −λ
(
−pn ∂n
∂t2
)
− δ = 0 (7)
Combining, we get
pn
∂n
∂t2
= pf
∂f
∂lf2
. (8)
An analogous condition holds for household member 1. Intuitively, at an optimum, each
household member must equate the ratio of marginal productivities across sectors to the inverse
price ratio.
2.3 Using labor adjustments to shocks to test for complementarities in production
Our first goal is to study the pattern of labor adjustments after a health shock. In the model, vari-
ation in individual i’s acute sickness may derive from variation in the health shock σi and/or
the variation in healthcare investment Qi. In empirical settings, σi is very difficult to measure,
and exogenous variation in σi is difficult to observe because health shocks are likely jointly de-
termined with health endowments and health preferences, which are unobserved to the econo-
metrician. Though Qi is by construction an endogenous choice of the household, variations in
the exogenous price of healthcare quality pQ may be used as an exogenous shifter of sickness in
order to explore its effects on the household’s reallocation of resources.
Differentiating equation 8 with respect to pQ, we obtain:
pn
(
∂2n
∂t2∂t1
∂t1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t22
∂t2
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
)
7
= pf
(
∂2f
∂lf2∂l
f
1
∂lf1
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2
2
∂lf2
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
)
(9)
The above equation indicates that the way in which household members adjust labor allo-
cations following an acute health shock (or, as expressed above, a shift in the price of curative
care) depends crucially on the shapes of the production functions for farm and non-farm labor.
We use this equation to formulate a test for the complementarity of household labor in these
production functions.
We are interested in particular in the labor responses of households with both sick and non-
sick members. Thus, let us examine equation 9 for the case in which σ1 = 1 and σ2 = 0 (that
is, only household member 1 is acutely ill). The fourth terms within parentheses ( ∂
2n
∂t2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
and
∂2f
∂lf2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
) on both sides of the equation equal 0 in this case, since ∂h2
∂pQ
= 0 when σ2 = 0. Further,
the third terms within parentheses ( ∂
2n
∂t2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
and ∂
2f
∂lf2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
) are also 0, since we have imposed
that the health of i does not directly affect the marginal productivity of −i (i.e. ∂2n∂t2∂h1 =
∂2f
∂lf2∂h1
=
0). Equation 9 can thus be written as
pn
(
∂2n
∂t2∂t1
∂t1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t22
∂t2
∂pQ
)
= pf
(
∂2f
∂lf2∂l
f
1
∂lf1
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2
2
∂lf2
∂pQ
)
(10)
The above equation forms the basis of our joint test of household labor complementarities.
The objects of interest are the cross-partials ∂
2n
∂t2∂t1
and ∂
2f
∂l2∂l1
. Note that ∂
2n
∂t22
< 0 and ∂
2f
∂l22
< 0
by the assumption of concavity of the production functions. The remaining four derivatives
constitute the extent of labor adjustments to shock across household members and activities
(i.e., ∂kj
∂pQ
for k ∈ {t, lf} and j ∈ {1, 2}).
Assuming complementarity or substitutability of farm and non-farm labor would yield pre-
dictions on the signs of these labor adjustments. Conversely, estimating these adjustment terms
and signing them imposes restrictions on the signs of ∂
2n
∂t2∂t1
and ∂
2f
∂l2∂l1
. Thus, estimating the
labor adjustments to health shocks across sectors allows us to test indirectly for the complemen-
tarity of substitutability of household labor. In the results section, we return to equation 10 to
use the estimated values of the adjustment terms to draw conclusions about the signs of the
cross-partials.
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3 Data
3.1 Overview
This study uses survey data from the Kagera region of Tanzania, an area west of Lake Victoria,
and bordering Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Kagera is mostly rural and primarily engaged
in producing bananas and coffee in the north, and rain-fed annual crops (maize, sorghum, and
cotton) in the south. The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) was conducted by
the World Bank and Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS). The sample
consists of 816 households from 51 “clusters” (or communities) located in 49 villages covering
all five districts of Kagera, interviewed up to four times, from Fall 1991 to January 1994, at
6 to 7 month intervals. The randomized sampling frame was based on the 1988 Tanzanian
Census.8 KHDS is a socio-economic survey following the model of previous World Bank Living
Standards Measurement Surveys. The survey covers individual-, household-, and cluster-level
data related to the economic livelihoods and health of individuals, and the characteristics of
households and communities. In the following paragraphs, we outline the variables we use in
our analyses.
3.2 Health variables
In the health module of the KHDS, all household members are asked about chronic illnesses and
acute illness episodes; care sought for these episodes; and current illness (at the time of survey).9
As our main sample restriction, we use information on whether households contained at least
one sick member (i.e. a member who reported having been sick in the last 14 days with an acute
illness) and one non-sick member. We collapse our observations to the household-year level,
by constructing within-household-year means for important health and labor supply variables.
Our means are constructed using the number of productive household members, which is de-
fined as the number of household members who answered the time use survey (all individuals
above the age of 7). We restrict the sample in this way so that the labor means do not erroneously
take into account household members for whom the time use survey was not asked.
Table I shows summary statistics for the Kagera sample. The number of household-year
observations with at least one sick and one non-sick household member is 2146; this comprises
75% of the household sample reported having at least one sick and one non-sick member. Within
these households, 42% of sick individuals report still being ill at the time of survey.
8A two-stage, randomized stratified sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, Census clusters (or
communities) were stratified based on agro-climactic zone and mortality rates and then were randomly sampled.
In the second stage, households within the clusters were stratified into “high-risk” and “low-risk” groups based on
illness and death of household members in the 12 months before enumeration, and then were randomly sampled.
9In the case of individuals below the age of 15, the primary caretaker of the child is asked to answer on the child’s
behalf.
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Our main independent variable is the proportion of sick household members who visited
formal-sector healthcare, defined as care at a hospital, health center or dispensary (which in-
cludes government, NGO, and private facilities). We normalize this variable by its standard
deviation for ease of interpretation. The mean for this normalized proportion is reported in
table 1. Without normalization, about 25% of sick household members sought formal sector
healthcare for their illness episode.
3.3 Labor variables
The time use module of the KHDS collects detailed information on various types of labor supply
for all individuals seven years of age and older. Individuals are asked how many hours in the
past 7 days they spent in each of a variety of activities. We construct a composite variable for the
total labor hours of household members above 7 years old. We then divide the total hours by
the number of productive household members to obtain a per-capita measure of hours across
1) all household members; 2) sick members; and 3) non-sick members. Finally, we break these
various per-capita measures in activity in different sectors.
In particular, we first split total labor hours into farm hours and non-farm hours. Then, we
further split each category into subcategories. We subdivide the farm hours into employment
hours, field and herd hours, and processing hours. Employment hours include hours spent
working on a neighbor’s farm, fishing, and working as a merchant. Other wage employment
outside of the home is included here as well; however, hired farm work makes up the largest
component of wage labor, hence its inclusion here. Field and herd hours include time spent on
the individual’s own farm, on a community farm and time spent herding livestock. Processing
hours include time spent making farm produce and animal products into marketable goods.
We subdivide non-farm hours into self-employment hours and home hours (which is then
further divided to display number of hours spent caring for an ill individual). Self-employment
includes any non-farm activities the profit from which accrues to the individual (as opposed
to working for someone else’s business); this may include household enterprise, production or
sale of market goods, or owning another type of small business (restaurant, hotel, etc.). Home
hours include time spent in household chores, and time spent collecting water and firewood.
For further details on the definitions of the labor supply variables and the method we used to
aggregate them into totals, please refer to the data appendix.
In table 1, we compare means in these labor variables for sick versus non-sick members in
households with at least 1 sick and 1 non-sick member; and for non-sick members of households
with no sick members (i.e. households in which all members are not acutely ill). Several inter-
esting features of the labor data are revealed. First, within “sick” households, sick and non-sick
members appear to be spending nearly the same amount of time in each sector and sub-sector.
For example, both types of individuals report working a total of about 30 hours last week. Of
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this time, a little less than half (13.5 hours) is spent on the farm, while the rest is spent in non-
farm labor, which is mostly comprised of home labor. t-tests confirm the statistical equality of
per-capita labor amounts across all sectoral categories.
On the other hand, we see significant differences (as again confirmed by t-tests) between the
amount worked by members in “sick” versus “non-sick” households. In households with no sick
members, total labor is significantly greater, and that difference is reflected in both sectors. In
percentage terms, farm labor is about 18% greater in “non-sick” households, while non-farm
labor is 14% greater.
The differences in these per-capita time use variables across “sick” and “non-sick” house-
holds, but not across sick and non-sick individuals within the same household, suggest that sick
and non-sick household members may adjust to illness shocks in the same way. In particular, at
least from the mean differences, it appears as though following illness, both sick and non-sick
individuals draw down farm labor relative to off-farm labor, while total labor hours declines
slightly. Clearly, we must not interpret these differences as causal estimates of sickness on the
intra-household allocation of labor. In subsequent sections, we test more rigorously that this
pattern of labor adjustments holds in a causal sense.
3.4 Other household- and cluster-level variables
We use a variety of household- and community-level demographic and socioeconomic charac-
teristics in our regressions. The most important for the purposes of our analysis is the existence
(or, to be precise, the lack of existence) of a formal healthcare facility in the cluster. As Table I
reports, about 50% of households were located in communities without a formal-sector health-
care facility. As we describe in Section 4, we control for a variety of other variables related
to the existence of other resources in one’s community; these are existence of a daily market,
periodic market, motorable road, public transportation, secondary school, bank, and post of-
fice/telephone. We also control for the distance to various types of formal-sector care options if
they are not in the household’s community; in particular, we include the distances to the nearest
dispensary, health facility, and hospital (n.b.: if these options are in the individual’s cluster, this
variable equals 0).10 Table 1 reports the means for these variables.
We control for various household characteristics. In particular, specifications include the
maximum years of completed schooling across all household members (quintiles); mean age of
household members (cubic polynomial); and household demographic composition, including
the number of females, adults (age 15 or older), children (younger than age 15), males, females,
men (adult males), women (adult females), boys (male children), and girls (female children). We
also include household size (cubic polynomial); total assets owned by the household (quintiles
10We control for a cubic polynomial in the distance to nearest formal-sector care facility (which could be any one
of the three types mentioned above), as well as quintiles of the distance to each option separately.
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of an asset index generated using principal components analysis); and year of survey (fixed
effects). Finally, we include district fixed effects.
3.5 Rainfall data
We obtained monthly rainfall data from the Tanzania Meteorological Agency spanning from
1980 to 2004.11 The data set includes the amount of rainfall (in millimeters) per month and total
days with rainfall per month for 21 weather stations in Kagera region. The data set provides
a matching file which report the closest and second closest weather station to each cluster in
the KHDS sample. Two measures of “closest” have been used: a straight-line distance between
each cluster and each rainfall station, and a distance measure which takes into account the loca-
tion topology of the area. We use the straight-line measure definition of “closest,” and use the
number of days of rainfall in the month the individual was sick as the primary measure of rain-
fall in our regressions. Further, we match the rainfall observation to the households with sick
members by taking the rainfall value in the month the household was surveyed, in the cluster
in which the household is located. If the rainfall value for this cluster-by-month observation is
missing, we use the value at the second closest rainfall station to the cluster.
We also control for the number of days of rainfall in the month prior to the illness episodes
reported by household members (discussed further in Section 4); the historical mean and his-
torical standard deviation of the distribution of rainfall in the given month, computed over all
the years of available data for the month in question (quadratic terms of these variables are in-
cluded as well); fixed effects for the closest rainfall station; deciles for the number of days of
rainfall; deciles for the amount of rainfall (in millimeters) in the month the individual fell sick;
and interactions of days of rainfall with the existence of resources variables defined in the previ-
ous sub-section. For further details on the construction of rainfall variables, please see the data
appendix.
4 Empirical strategy
Our goal in this section is to propose and discuss the validity of an instrument for healthcare
choice, and to discuss how we use the variation induced by the instrument to first verify the
effects of healthcare choices on health outcomes and then to explore effects on intra-household
labor allocations. The observed patterns in labor supply responses within the household enable
us to test for labor complementarities among family members using the predictions of the model
of household behavior described in Section 2.
11The data set is downloadable from the EDI-Africa website: http://www.edi-
africa.com/research/khds/introduction.htm.
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4.1 An instrument for healthcare choice
Let Oij denote an outcome for household i in cluster j, let hij denote the household’s composite
healthcare choice (calculated as the proportion of sick individuals in the household sent to for-
mal sector care), and let Xij denote a vector of household- and community-level characteristics.
Consider the following empirical model:
Oij = βhij + X′ijγ + ij . (11)
As discussed extensively in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), measuring the relationship
between healthcare choice and health outcomes using OLS, as shown above in equation 11,
likely results in a biased estimate of the effect of h on O, due to unobserved determinants of
outcomes in the error term  that are correlated with healthcare choice. In particular, the severity
of the health shock likely influences the care option chosen as well as the outcome. That is,
household members with higher-severity illnesses are more likely to be sent to higher quality
healthcare options; and higher-severity illnesses will generate worse health and labor outcomes.
To address these endogeneity concerns, we use an instrument for healthcare choice which
exploits exogenous variation in the costs of formal-sector healthcare. The instrument builds on
the methodology introduced in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a) and applied in Adhvaryu
and Nyshadham (2010b) at the individual level to the same data used in this study. A major
point discussed in those papers is the fact that the largest costs of formal-sector care in develop-
ing countries are often those associated with the opportunity cost (or the direct costs) of travel
to the care facility. Distance to the nearest facility (or alternatively, the presence of a formal
care facility in one’s community) is thus a large determinant of healthcare choice in developing
countries, through its effects on costs (Gertler et al. 1987, Mwabu et al. 1995, Mwabu 2009).
Following Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), we propose an interaction instrument: specif-
ically, we interact a dummy variable for the absence of a formal-sector health facility in a house-
hold’s community with the number of days of rainfall in the month in which the household
reported having at least one ill member, and exclude only this interaction from the second stage,
while controlling for the main effects of facility “existence” and days of rainfall in the first and
second stages of a two-stage instrumental variables estimator. In doing so, we use as our in-
strument only the temporary, random amplification caused by rainfall of the opportunity cost
of time represented in the facility existence dummy, thereby avoiding issues of unobserved sys-
tematic variation in long-term access to resources that accompany the use of facility existence
alone.
The two stages of analysis are specified as follows. Define NoFacj to be a dummy variable
which equals 1 if no formal-sector health facility exists in cluster j, and Rij to be the number
of days of rainfall in cluster j in the month in which household i reported having at least one
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sick member (and one non-sick member, to allow for analysis on intrahousehold labor effects of
sickness).12 The two-step estimator is written as follows:
1st stage: hij = α1 (NoFacij x Rij) + α2NoFacij + α3Rij + X′ijα4 + ζij (12)
2nd stage: Oij = β1hij + β2NoFacij + β3Rij + X′ijβ4 + ij (13)
The intuition behind the instrument is simple. The main effects of facility non-existence and
rainfall are likely both negative; that is, not having a facility in a household’s community and
being exposed to more rainfall should, for the purposes of travel costs, discourage the household
from sending sick members to formal-sector health facilities. Moreover, heavier rains should
discourage households that are farther away more than households located in a community with
a health facility.
Imagine one household located directly next to a facility, while another is located many
villages away. In times of dry weather, clearly the household in the community with a health
facility will be more likely to choose formal-sector care than the one farther away. However, in
times of heavy rains, the rain should incrementally deter the farther household more than the
one just next door.
4.2 Instrument validity
Ideally, we would like variation in the instrument to be equivalent to experimental variation in
the price of formal-sector care. That is, we would like to answer the question, “Holding all other
prices constant, if we shift only the price of formal-sector care, how does the demand for this
care change, and subsequently, how do these shifts affect health and labor supply outcomes?”
One crucial element of our argument is thus that the interaction instrument must induce price
changes solely in the costs of formal-sector care, as opposed to shifting other prices which deter-
mine access to other resources, as well as directly influence consumption and labor allocations.
4.2.1 Controlling for general remoteness
It is plausible that fluctuations in rainfall induce differential price shifts in communities with
health facilities as compared with communities without. For example, suppose non-existence
of a formal care facility was correlated with a community’s general remoteness; that is, commu-
nities lacking health facilities lacked access to other important resources (commodity and labor
markets, roads, irrigation, etc.). In controlling for the main effect of the existence of a health
12We define the facility “existence” variable in the negative in order to make interpretation of the interaction
coefficient easier; of course, changing this variable to reflect the existence of a health facility as opposed to the lack
of existence has no effect on the estimation procedure or the results (barring changing the sign of the coefficients on
the interaction term and the main effect of facility existence).
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facility in the community, and excluding only its interaction with days of rainfall, we control
for the long-term, baseline effects of access to various resources, as mentioned above. However,
since rainfall, through the interaction instrument, acts as a randomized amplifier of the costs of
access to formal-sector care, rainfall could amplify the costs of access to these other resources
as well. If this were true, the instrument would not be excludable. To address this problem,
borrowing the strategy used in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham (2010b), we control for the existence
and distance to a variety of important resources, as well as the interactions of these variables
with days of rainfall.13 Controlling for the main effects of this rich set of variables and its inter-
action with rainfall ensures that the variation induced by the instrument is specific to the costs
of formal-sector care.
4.2.2 Selection into sickness
One desirable feature of the instrument for healthcare choice must be that it does not predict
selection into sickness, but rather only the choice of care conditional on acute sickness. To check
that this is indeed the case, we regress a dummy for having at least one sick member and one
non-sick member in the household of at least 7 years of age on the interaction instrument, the
main effects, and the full set of controls. The results, reported in column 1 of Table A.1, verify
that the instrument does not predict selection into acute sickness: the coefficient on the inter-
action instrument is a precisely estimated zero. In columns 2-4 of Table A.1, we report results
from similar regressions which check that the instrument does not predict selection into the
other samples used in our analysis: households with one sick member and one non-sick male,
households with one sick member and one non-sick female, and households with no sick mem-
bers.
4.2.3 Instrument does not shift labor supply for non-sick households
We posit that the interaction instrument shifts the costs of access to formal-sector care, and
thus generates exogenous shifts in the healthcare choices–and ultimately the health and labor
outcomes–of sick individuals. If this is the dominant mechanism through which our instrument
works, we should not observe that this variable shifts labor allocations for households with no
sick members. To test this hypothesis, we regress per-capita labor outcomes (hours of non-sick
members aggregated to the household level, divided by number of non-sick household mem-
bers) on the instrument and the full set of controls using the sample of households which had
no sick members. The results, reported in Table A.3, verify that the instrument does not predict
fluctuations in labor hours for all categories of labor included in our analysis; in each case, the
13For example, we include existence of a daily market, motorable road, public transport, and secondary school; for
a full listing of the variables included, please refer to the note at the bottom of Table II.
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coefficient is quite small and insignificantly different from zero. This falsification provides fur-
ther evidence that the instrument affects labor outcomes purely through its effect on healthcare
choice, and therefore, evidence of the validity of the instrument’s exclusion from second stage
regressions.
4.2.4 Nonlinear effects of endogenous distance
Finally, we allow for the possibility that distance enters the first and second stages nonlinearly.
We do this to further preclude the possibility that the interaction instrument is only capturing
a nonlinear effect of distance (or extreme remoteness), rather than the interaction of distance
with a randomized, transitory source of variation. To account for this concern, we include quin-
tiles of the distribution of distance to the nearest health facility, hospital and dispensary in all
regressions.
5 Results
5.1 First Stage Results
Results from the first stage regressions are presented in Table II. In the first stage specification in
column 1, we regress the proportion of sick individuals in the household who visited a health-
care facility (normalized by its standard deviation) on the proposed instrument of the interaction
of days of rainfall in month of survey and a dummy for the lack of a formal-sector healthcare
facility in the individual’s community. The results in column 1 of Table II show a significant
reduction in the proportion of sick individuals choosing formal-sector care when the interaction
instrument increases. The F-stat on the instrument coefficient is nearly 16 (p = 0.000135).
As a robustness check to a different set of controls, we run the same specification as reported
in column 1 excluding, first, all demographic controls and then interactions of days of rainfall
and resource existence dummies as well (see section 3 for details). The results, reported in
columns 2 and 3 of Table II, respectively, are qualitatively similar to the original specification,
though the coefficient on the instrument and the F-stat are reduced in column 3.
In column 4 of Table II, we report the results of a specification with the full set of controls but
excluding the interaction instrument. Here, as expected, we see a strongly negative correlation
between choosing formal-sector care and the non-existence of a health facility in the household’s
village. The coefficient on days of rainfall in the month of survey is small and insignificant.
This result is also in line with our expectations, as the composite effect of rainfall on healthcare
choice is conceptually ambiguous: as discussed in section 4, rainfall affects not only the cost of
travel to a facility but also many other economic and health-related outcomes for households in
agricultural societies.
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5.2 Health Outcomes
Column 1 of Table III presents results from the second stage IV regression of the proportion of
household sick who were still ill at the time of survey on the normalized proportion of house-
hold sick who visited formal-sector care. The results show a large and significant reduction in
the proportion of individuals still ill when these individuals are driven exogenously to formal-
sector care.
The magnitude of these results corresponds to the results in Adhvaryu and Nyshadham
(2010b), which applies a similar analysis at an individual level to the same data, and in Ad-
hvaryu and Nyshadham (2010a), which applies a similar analysis to nationally representative
data on children under five in Tanzania. Note that the marked attenuation in the OLS estimates
reported in column 2 of Table III is also consistent with estimates from previous studies and
corresponds to bias due to self-selection into formal-sector care on the basis of severity.
5.3 Intra-Household Labor Responses
Now that we have verified the power of the interaction instrument to predict the use of formal-
sector care and the effects of formal-sector care on health outcomes, we next investigate the
effects of formal healthcare on the labor supply of sick and non-sick members of the house-
hold. We noted in the summary statistics that both household sick and non-sick members (in
households with at least one of each) seem to have the same allocations of labor across farm and
non-farm activities. In order to identify the causal effect of formal-sector acute care on the labor
supply of household members, we run the same IV specification reported in column 1 of Table
III with per capita labor supplies as outcomes. In Table IV, we present results on total labor sup-
ply and on allocations of total labor to farm and non-farm activities for sick individuals. Each
outcome is calculated by summing across sick members of the household and dividing by the
number of sick members.
The results in Table IV show that when sick household members are exogenously driven
to formal-sector care, they reallocate their time away from non-farm labor and back towards
farm labor. When the proportion of sick household members who visited formal-sector care
is increased by a standard deviation, non-farm labor of each of the sick household members is
decreased by more than 10 hours on average and farm labor is increased by nearly 9 hours on
average during the week prior to survey. Both effects are significant at the 5 percent level.
In Table V, we report the same regressions conducted on household non-sick labor supplies.
The results show the same pattern among non-sick members of the household as was reported
in Table IV among sick household members. That is, when sick members of the household are
driven exogenously to formal-sector care, the non-sick members of the household also draw
down their non-farm labor and increase their farm labor. The estimates show that when the
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proportion of sick members who visited formal-sector care is increased by one standard devia-
tion, each non-sick member of the household decreases their non-farm labor by an average of
more than 9 hours and increases their farm labor by roughly 4 hours on average. The effect on
the non-farm labor of non-sick members is significant at the 5 percent level, while the effect on
farm labor is not significant at conventional levels.
Table VI shows results from the same regressions for labor supplies of all members of the
households. The dependent variables in the regressions reported in Table VI are calculated by
summing across all productive members of the household, both sick and non-sick, and dividing
by the number of productive members. The pattern of results is as expected given the results on
the subsamples of sick and non-sick household members: non-farm labor decreases and farm
labor increases as a result of an increase in the proportion of sick household members visiting
formal health facilities.
Exploring further these effects on farm and non-farm labor, in Tables VII-IX, we break down
the effects of formal sector care on labor supplies into effects on subsets of farm and non-farm
activities. We show employment hours, hours spent in the field and herding, hours spent pro-
cessing farm and animal products as subsets of farm labor; and self-employment and home
chores as subsets of non-farm labor.
In Table VII, we see that the positive effects of formal sector care on the farm labor hours
of sick household members are concentrated in hours spent in the field and herding livestock.
These results correspond to the idea that the productivity of sick household members is most af-
fected in activities which require much physical effort, and that participation in these high effort
activities is restored when sick members receive high quality care. We also find that negative
effects on non-farm labor hours of sick household members are concentrated in hours spent in
self-employment. That is, it would appear that when household members fall acutely ill and are
made consequently less productive on the farm, they substitute away from farm activities and
towards self-enterprise activities which are more able to be completed at home.
In Table VIII, we find similar patterns of results on subsets of farm and non-farm labor hours
amongst non-sick members of the household. In particular, effects on non-farm labor hours are
concentrated on self-employment hours. Effects on farm labor hours are split between employ-
ment hours and hours spent in the field and herding livestock. The largest effects seem to be on
employment hours (which are in large part made up of working on neighbors’ farms, fishing,
and wage labor for educational and health institutions); however, these results lack precision
and should be interrupted with caution. Table IX shows results from the same regressions on
the whole household. The pattern of results is as expected given the results on sick and non-sick
subsamples reported in Tables VII and VIII.
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5.4 Labor Complementarities
In section 2, it was demonstrated how estimates of the labor adjustments of sick and non-sick
household members could be used to test for the presence of complementarities in farm and
non-farm labor. Using the estimates described above, we return to equation 10, and examine
the case in which ∂l
f
1
∂pQ
,
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∂pQ
< 0 (decrease in farm labor) and ∂t1
∂pQ
, ∂t2
∂pQ
> 0 (increase in non-farm
labor):
pn
 ∂2n∂t2∂t1 ∂ˆt1∂pQ︸︷︷︸
>0
+
∂2n
∂t22︸︷︷︸
<0
∂ˆt2
∂pQ︸︷︷︸
>0
 = pf
 ∂
2f
∂lf2∂l
f
1
ˆ
∂lf1
∂pQ︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂2f
∂lf2
2︸︷︷︸
<0
ˆ
∂lf2
∂pQ︸︷︷︸
<0
 (14)
Plugging these signs into equation 10, we obtain the following inequality:
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is a positive constant. We conclude that ∂
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and ∂
2f
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cannot
both be negative; that is, production in at least one sector must exhibit complementarities in
household labor.
Thus our results suggest that at least one, and perhaps all, of the productive activities in
which members of the agricultural households in our sample engage must exhibit complemen-
tarities among the labor inputs of various members of the household. This is potentially an
important result, given the frequency with which previous studies of the agricultural house-
hold have assumed that family labor inputs are at least imperfectly substitutable. The pattern
of empirical results in this study suggests that the substitutability of family labor inputs in the
agricultural household model is not necessarily an appropriate assumption in all settings.
5.5 Farm-specific Complementarities
As discussed, our test is a composite one for complementarities in at least one sector of produc-
tion. Therefore, we have so far provided empirical evidence of the existence of labor comple-
mentarities in farm and/or home production. However, though we might hypothesize that cer-
tain farm activities likely exhibit labor complementarities, we must provide additional evidence
to support such a hypothesis.
In Tables X-XII, we report results from second stage regressions of the proportion of house-
hold members participating in certain farm activities on healthcare choice of sick household
members. The specifications are identical to those reported in previous tables, however the out-
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comes are proportions of sick, non-sick, and all household members participating in activities
as opposed to per capita hours spent in these activities because data on hours spent in specific
farm-related activities was not collected.
In Table X, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick household
members visiting formal-sector care induces nearly a 20 percentage point decrease in the per-
centage of sick household members who participated in crop maintenance (weeding, pruning,
fertilizing, etc.). Correspondingly, a one standard deviation increase in formal-sector care use
induces roughly a 21 percentage point increase in the percentage of sick household members
participating in the harvesting and bringing to market of crops.
These results, once again, correspond to a larger reduction in the productivity of sick house-
hold members in high effort activities (such as harvesting and carrying crops to market), as
compared to lower effort activities (such as weeding and pruning), as a result of an acute health
shock. Consequently, we find evidence of a substitution away from harvesting and toward crop
maintenance when ill, and back toward harvesting when recovered.
Of particular interest is the parallel pattern of results for farm activity of non-sick household
members reported in Table XI. We find effects on farm activity of non-sick household mem-
bers in the same direction and of similar magnitude as those on farm activity of sick members.
That is, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick household members visiting
formal-sector care induces nearly a 19 percentage point reduction in the percentage of non-sick
household members participating in crop maintenance and a more than 18 percentage point
increase in the percentage of non-sick household members participating in harvesting and mar-
keting activities. Table XII shows a nearly identical pattern amongst the household as a whole, as
expected. This is fairly strong evidence of the existence of labor complementarities specifically
in farm production. That is, we have evidence that at least one of these farm-related activities
exhibits labor complementarities.
6 Alternative Explanations
6.1 Externality to Non-Farm Labor
Previous literature has emphasized hours spent caring for ill household members as a compo-
nent of intra-household labor reallocations in response to health shocks (Pitt and Rosenzweig
1990). It is possible that an added return to time spent off the farm by non-sick household
members (that is, an ability to simultaneously care for sick household members while engag-
ing in non-farm labor), might masquerade as an observed complementarity between sick and
non-sick labor without the existence of true complementarities in either production technology.
However, it should be noted that the additional evidence presented above in favor of labor
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complementarities specifically in farm-related activities mitigates this concern.
Nevertheless, we are able to test directly for effects of formal healthcare on care hours of
non-sick household members in order to evaluate the validity in our empirical context of this
alternative explanation. If an externality to home labor in the presence of health shocks is in fact
a primary explanation for the pattern of empirical results discussed above, we should expect
to find that an increase in the proportion of sick household members who visited formal-sector
care reduces the number of hours spent by non-sick members of the household caring for sick
household members.
The results from this regression are reported in column 1 of Table XIII. We find a small and
weakly significant positive effect of an increase in the proportion of household sick who visited a
health facility on care hours of non-sick household members. A one standard deviation increase
in the proportion of sick household members visiting formal health facilities generates only a
1 hour increase in care hours per non-sick. This likely cannot explain the shift from non-farm
to farm labor among non-sick members, given that care hours are likely not spent on the farm.
Furthermore, compared to the roughly 10 hour reallocation from non-farm to farm labor among
non-sick household members shown in Table V, this 1 hour increase in care hours is quite small.
Columns 3 and 5 report results from these same regressions conducted on male and female
subsamples of non-sick household members, respectively. If time spent caring for sick house-
hold members is in fact a primary explanation for the labor reallocation pattern observed in
the data, we would expect that female care hours might respond more to formal care. We find
no significant effects on care hours, even among females who are thought to be more likely to
provide care to sick members of the household.
Lastly, we would expect that the care hours explanation would likely be most appropriate
when children make up most of the sick members of the household. Columns 2, 4, and 6 of
Table XIII report results from regressions of the care hours of all non-sick, male non-sick, and
female non-sick members, respectively, on both the proportion of sick members visiting formal
care facilities and its interaction with the proportion of sick members in the household that are
children. We instrument for the interaction with the interaction of our usual instrument and the
proportion of sick members who are children. Again, we find that, even when all the sick mem-
bers of the household are children, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick
members visiting formal health facilities generates a small and weakly significant positive effect
on the care hours of all non-sick members, and smaller insignificant effects on the subsamples
of non-sick male and females.
6.2 Health Spillovers
Another candidate explanation which might give the appearance of complementarities is the
presence health spillovers between acutely ill members and reportedly non-sick members of
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the household. Several types of spillovers must be considered. First, household members may
value each other’s health; second, health shocks to one household member may affect another
member’s health directly through disease contagion; third, individuals seeking treatment for
acute health shocks may enable easier access to medicines or information for other (non-acutely
ill) members of the household (treatment spillovers). We address these in succession below.
6.2.1 Utility spillovers
As relates to the first concern, our model explicitly allows for utility spillovers of health. Each
individual’s utility function is allowed to depend (non-separably) on both own health and the
health of the other household member. As shown in section 2, our test of complementarities
goes through when allowing for utility spillovers of health.
6.2.2 Contagion
The second possibility–that health shocks spill over across household members due to contagion–
is one that until now we have explicitly disallowed from the model. To understand what prob-
lems contagion-based health spillovers would generate for our test of complementarities, sup-
pose that each household member’s health were a function of own health shock and the health
shocks of the other household member. Thus for i ∈ {1, 2}we now have
hi = h(σiQi, σ−iQ−i, εi, ε−i). (16)
Clearly, in this case, ∂h−i
∂pQ
is in general non-zero, even when σ−i = 0; that is, non-sick indi-
viduals’ health stocks are directly affected by health shocks to other members in the household.
Indeed, we may expect that ∂h−i
∂pQ
< 0, since, in the case when contagion matters, increases in
the price of acute healthcare will worsen the effects of health shocks for both sick and healthy
individuals. Equation 10, from which we derive our test of complementarities, now becomes
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From the equation above, we can see that the validity of our test for complementarities in
household labor depends on the signs of the additional terms on either side of equation 17.
Maintaining the signs of the estimated labor adjustment terms (as well as the assumptions on
the concavity of production with respect to labor), it is easy to see that inequality ?? still holds if
∂2f
∂lf2∂h2
>
∂2n
∂t2∂h2
. (18)
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That is, even in the presence of contagion effects, our test for complementarities will be
valid if complementarities between health and labor are greater for farm vis-a-vis non-farm
production.14 This statement would be consistent with the fact that farm labor requires more
physicality (e.g. more physical effort, more calories expended) than non-farm labor. However,
if the above inequality does not hold, we cannot in general determine the validity of the test;
validity will depend in this case on the relative magnitudes of the various terms above.
We cannot determine empirically whether the inequality above actually holds. However,
it does seem implausible in our context that health spillovers through contagion can entirely
explain the pattern of adjustments we observe. Since we divide the household into individuals
who reported being acutely sick and those who did not, the contagion effect would need to be
small enough that though non-sick individuals (as we classify them) are affected, they are not
affected enough to report being sick, but large enough that it drives changes in the labor allocations
of the non-sick that are commensurate, both in absolute magnitude and as a percentage of total
hours, with the changes observed for sick household members. We find (subjectively of course)
the likelihood to be small that the contagion effect achieves this balance perfectly.
6.2.3 Treatment spillovers
The third concern regarding to spillover effects relates to the idea that treatment sought by
acutely ill members of the household has spillover effects on the health of non-sick members.
One might imagine that household members who are chronically ill, but not acutely so, accom-
pany acutely ill members to treatment, or that acutely ill individuals bring back medication
or treatment-related information to other members of the household. These examples can be
explained by the same extension to the model as shown above.
In this case, we would expect to see that increases in the proportion of sick members of
the household visiting formal care generates improvements in the health status of reportedly
non-acutely-ill members of the household (either through reduced contagion brought about by
improved health outcomes of sick members or through healthcare spillovers from sick members
visiting formal care). In columns 1-3 of Table XIV, we report results from second stage IV regres-
sions of the proportion of non-sick members who reported chronic illness on the proportion of
sick members who visited formal healthcare in our usual specification. We find no significant
effects of the formal healthcare of sick members on chronic fever, weight loss, and rash among
non-sick members.
In columns 4-6 of Table XIV, we check the reduced form of the same regressions we re-
ported in columns 1-3, in case the instrument affects non-sick health outcomes directly by other
channels than the formal care of sick household members. Again, we find no significant ef-
14Of course, the reverse statement holds if health and labor are substitutes in the production processes.
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fects. Lastly, in columns 7-9, we check that the instrument has no effect on the chronic illness
of members of households with no sick members. A significant coefficient would suggest that
the exclusion restriction might be violated. We find precisely estimated zeros across all chronic
illnesses.
7 Conclusion
Previous studies of intra-household decision-making in the agricultural household have gen-
erally resorted to assumptions on the complementarity or substitutability of family labor. We
develop a model of health and intra-household allocations in which both sick and non-sick
members allocate their time across farm labor, non-farm labor, and leisure. Our simple test of
complementarities relies on the observation that acute sickness, and corresponding treatment
choices, generate variation in the productivities of both sick and non-sick individuals in the
household. The model predicts that sick and non-sick household members will adjust their la-
bor allocations in parallel fashion only if their labor is complementary in at least one sector of
production.
We then use plausibly exogenous variation in the cost of formal-sector health care to show
that, in fact, an increase in the proportion of sick members visiting formal health facilities gen-
erates a decrease in non-farm labor and an increase in farm labor among both sick and non-sick
members. These results provide strong evidence that within family labor is complementary in
farm and/or non-farm production. Note, however, that this is an indirect test for labor com-
plementarities. That is, the predictions from the model require only that at least one of the
production technologies exhibit complementarities in labor for sick and non-sick labor supplies
to adjust in parallel fashion across farm and non-farm activities.
We then provide additional evidence of parallel shifts among sick and non-sick household
members away from lower effort farm activities back towards higher effort farm activities when
sick household members are made well through formal-sector care. These results suggest that
at least some of these farm-specific activities exhibit labor complementarities. We further show
evidence that neither an externality to non-farm labor in the form of caring for sick household
members nor health spillovers can explain the observed pattern in labor responses to formal
healthcare in our context.
Our findings on the complementarity of labor in production activities of the agricultural
household are not specific to the effects of health shocks on labor allocations, but rather can
hopefully inform the modeling of time and resource allocations within the agricultural house-
hold more generally. Our results suggest that we must take care when modeling shocks and/or
policy interventions which affect the relative marginal productivities of labor or the opportunity
cost of time for members of agricultural households, to account for the various production ac-
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tivities across which each member allocates his time and the ways in which family labor inputs
interact in these production technologies.
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A Model Appendix
A.1 When Agricultural Wage Labor Constraints Do Not Bind
In the unconstrained case of the model, in which agricultural wage labor constraints do not
bind, we arrive at the same two first order conditions as in equations 6 and 7. We combine these
with the first order condition with respect to lh, hired labor on the farm, which is as follows
(using the same notation as in section 2):
−λ(−w)− δ = 0. (19)
Combining, we get
pf
∂f
∂lf2
= w = pn
∂n
∂t2
. (20)
We begin with the second equality in equation 20: w = pn ∂n∂t2 . Differentiating with respect to
pQ, we get:
∂2n
∂t2∂t1
∂t1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t22
∂t2
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
= 0. (21)
Note that farm production does not play a role in the equation above, meaning that the
implications we derive from above will solely be related to non-farm labor. As before, ∂
2n
∂t2∂h1
= 0,
and ∂h2
∂pQ
= 0 when σ2 = 0, and thus
∂2n
∂t2∂t1
∂t1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t22
∂t2
∂pQ
= 0 (22)
Plugging in the estimated signs of the labor adjustments and making use of the concavity
assumption as before ( ∂ˆt1
∂pQ
> 0, ∂ˆt1
∂pQ
> 0, ∂
2n
∂t22
< 0), we find that ∂
2n
∂t2∂t1
> 0, i.e. that household
labor in non-farm production must exhibit complementarities.
Using the first equality in equation 20 (pf ∂f
∂lf2
= w), and plugging in the estimated signs of
the farm labor adjustments as well as the concavity assumption on farm labor in production, we
get a similar implication for farm labor: ∂
2f
∂lf2∂l
f
1
> 0, i.e. that household labor in farm production
must exhibit complementarities as well. Thus a stronger conclusion than the one in the con-
strained case holds when agricultural wage labor is not constrained: here, labor in both sectors
must exhibit complementarities.
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A.2 Land as an Input Into Farm Production
Here we consider the case in which farm production takes land as an input. Let the farm pro-
duction function be f(lf1 , l
f
2 , l
h, h1, h2;A), where A is the total plot area. Differentiating equation
8 with respect to pQ as before, we obtain the same equality as in equation 9, but with an added
term on the right-hand side, corresponding to the addition of A to the production function.
Equation 9 therefore becomes
pn
(
∂2n
∂t2∂t1
∂t1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t22
∂t2
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
+
∂2n
∂t2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
)
= pf
(
∂2f
∂lf2∂l
f
1
∂lf1
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2
2
∂lf2
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2∂h1
∂h1
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2∂h2
∂h2
∂pQ
+
∂2f
∂lf2∂A
∂A
∂pQ
)
. (23)
When ∂A
∂pQ
is 0, the above equation is the same as equation 9. In fact, we find that in our
context land is most often inherited and less frequently bought and sold on spot markets. That
is, a household would likely find it very difficult to make short-term changes to their stock of
land, and we do not see such high-frequency variation in the data. Specifically, amongst our
main sample of household with at least one sick member and one non-sick member, roughly
48 percent of land owned by the household was inherited, while only 23 percent was bought
at some point. Most importantly, only .4 percent of land currently owned was bought in the 6
months prior to survey.
B Additional Results
B.1 Sample Selection
In Table A.1, we report results from sample selection regressions of dummies for inclusion in
the various samples used in the analysis on the interaction instrument, the main effects of the
facility non-existence dummy and days of rainfall in the month of survey, and the full set of
controls used in the preferred first and second stage regressions. Column 1 reports results from
the specification checking for selection into the sample of households with one sick and one
non-sick member above the age of 7 on the basis of the instrument. Columns 2 and 3 report
results from checks for selection into the samples of households with one sick member and one
non-sick member who is male and female, respectively. Column 4 reports results from the check
for selection into the sample of households with no sick members. Across all checks, we find no
evidence that the instrument predicts selection into the sample.
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B.2 Collinearity Between Instrument and Resource Access Controls
To the degree that general remoteness strongly predicts both the presence of all resources in
the community, including health facilities, we might be worried about collinearity between the
health facility non-existence dummy and the dummies for the presence of other resources in
the community such as daily market, motorable road, post office or telephone, etc. Table A.2
reports results from the regression of the No Facility dummy on the resource dummies included
in set of controls of the preferred specifications from the analysis. The results show significant
correlations, but sufficient residual variation in the No Facility dummy. The R-squared is only
.324, indicating that nearly two-thirds of the variation in the No Facility dummy is orthogonal
to the various resource access controls. Therefore, collinearity is not an issue.
B.3 Falsification on Non-Sick Households
A crucial assumption for the validity of the empirical strategy used in the analysis is the exclud-
ability of the interaction instrument from second stage regressions. In order for this assumption
to hold, we must believe that the instrument affects second stage outcomes only through its
effects on formal healthcare use.
As a falsification exercise to check the appropriateness of this assumption, we run our usual
labor supply regressions in reduced form on households with no sick members. If in fact the
instrument has no effect on labor supply except through its effects on the formal care use of
sick members of the households, we should expect to find no effects of the instrument on labor
outcomes of members of households with no sick members. In Table A.3, results from these
reduced form regressions confirm that the instrument does not predict total labor supply nor
labor allocations across productive activities of members of entirely non-sick households.
B.4 Heterogeneity
B.4.1 Sick and Non-Sick Labor Responses By Gender and Age
In Tables A.4 and A.5, we investigate heterogeneity in the sick and non-sick labor responses
to formal care use across gender and age. In Table A.4, we regress the usual per capita labor
supply variables for sick and non-sick members on both the proportion of sick members visiting
formal care and its interaction with the proportion of sick members who are male in the usual
specification. We again instrument for the interaction with the product of our usual interaction
instrument and the proportion of sick members who are male.
The results in the top panel of Table A.4 show that when all the sick members in the house-
hold are male, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick members visiting
formal care generates the same 9 hours increase in farm labor seen among all non-sick members
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in Table V but a significantly larger 15 hour decrease in non-farm labor. This larger decrease in
non-farm labor among sick males (as compared to females) is made up entirely of home chores,
and generates a statistically significant 7 hour decrease in total labor hours. In contrast, when
all the sick members of the household are female, while a one standard deviation increase in
the proportion visiting formal care still generates a 9 hour increase in farm labor it causes a
large (more than 9 hour) decrease in self-employment hours and a small, insignificant increase
of 4 hours in home chores. The result is an insignificant reduction of 5 hours in non-farm labor
among sick females.
In the bottom panel of Table A.4, we report the results for the same regressions as in the
top panel, but with non-sick labor hours as outcomes. The results show that when all the sick
members of the household are male, non-sick members of the household reallocate their labor
much less than in response to sick females. A one standard deviation increase in the proportion
of sick visiting formal healthcare, when all sick members are male, generates a small 1 hour
decrease in total non-sick labor hours, a small insignificant 3 hour increase in farm labor, and a
4 hour decrease in non-farm labor. This small decrease in non-farm labor in response to the use
of formal-healthcare amongst sick males is made up of a 6 hour decrease in self-employment
and a 2 hour increase in home chores. Again, we find a contrasting response in non-sick labor
hours to formal care among sick females. Total labor hours of non-sick members decrease by an
average of 9 hours when the proportion visiting healthcare increases by one standard deviation
and all sick members are female. Farm hours increase insignificantly by 4 hours, and non-farm
hours decrease by 14 hours. The decrease in non-farm hours is significant at the 1 percent level
and is made up of a 6 hour decrease in self-employment and an 8 hour decrease in home chores.
In summary, it seems that the labor hours of sick males respond more to formal healthcare
than that of sick females, with comparable increases in farm labor but larger decreases in home
chores. On the other hand, non-sick labor supply responds more to formal healthcare use among
sick females, with larger decreases in home chores as well.
Table A.5 reports results from regressions exploring heterogeneity across age. The specifica-
tions are identical to those reported in Table A.4, but we interact the proportion visiting formal
care with the proportion of sick members who are children instead of the proportion of sick who
are male. The results in the top panel show that when all sick household members are children
a one standard deviation increase in the proportion visiting formal care causes only a 3 hour
increase in farm labor of sick members and a decrease of more than 8 hours in non-farm labor,
made up largely of a decrease in self-employment. On the other hand, when all sick household
members are adults, an increase in the proportion visiting formal care brings about a 10 hour
increase in farm labor and a 9 hour decrease in non-farm labor (mostly, self-employment).
Effects on household non-sick labor, reported in the bottom panel of Table A.5, seem to be
less heterogeneous across the age of household members who fall ill. That is, non-sick non-
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farm labor decreases significantly by nearly 10 hours (mostly, in self-employment) with a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of sick members visiting formal care irrespective
of whether the sick members of the household are adults or children, and farm labor increases
insignificantly.
Overall, it seems sick children do not adjust their farm hours much following formal health-
care but significantly reduce their non-farm labor, particularly their hours spent in self-employment;
while adults also significantly reduce their self-employment hours, but significantly increase
their farm labor in exchange. Non-sick labor supply in the household responds the same to
sickness and healthcare among children and adults: self-employment hours decrease signifi-
cantly, farm labor increases insignificantly.
B.4.2 Degree of Complementarity Across Gender and Age
In Tables A.6 and A.7, we explore the degree of complementarity across gender and age. To
do so, we run regressions identical to those reported in Tables A.4 and A.5, but with gender-
specific per capita labor hours as outcomes. In the top panel of Table A.6, the results suggest
that male non-sick labor hours respond more to the proportion of household sick visiting formal
care when all sick members are female than when all sick members are male. That is, non-sick
male non-farm labor decreases significantly by nearly 12 hours and farm hours increase weakly
by 5 hours when all sick members are female, but non-farm labor decreases weakly by only 6
hours and farm labor is virtually unaffected when all sick members are male (differences are
significant for farm labor and home chores at the 10 percent level). In the bottom panel of Table
A.6, results suggest that female non-sick labor hours also respond more to formal healthcare
use by sick household members when those members are female as compared to when sick
household members are all male.
The results reported in the top panel of Table A.7 show little evidence of heterogeneity across
the age of sick household members in labor supply responses by non-sick children. Non-sick
child non-farm labor decreases by roughly 9 hours (self-employment decreases by 2 hours and
home time decreases by nearly 7 hours) with a one standard deviation increase in proportion
of household sick visiting a formal health facility, regardless of the proportion of sick who are
children, and farm labor appears unaffected. Similarly, in the bottom panel we find no signifi-
cant differences in non-sick adult labor supply responses across age of household sick; however,
the point estimates suggest that farm labor increases and non-farm labor reductions in non-sick
adult labor might be slightly larger when all sick household members are children.
Overall, the results suggest that female labor is complementary to other female labor and to
male labor, but that male labor is less complementary to other male labor. Also, it seems that
child labor is complementary to other child labor, and perhaps that adult and child labor are
slightly stronger complements.
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C Construction of variables
The following list describes the construction of variables used in analysis:
• sick = 1 if the household reported having at least one member who was sick with an
illness that began 14 days or less prior to the date of survey, sick = 0 otherwise.
• h = 1 if sick individual visited hospital, health center or dispensary (government, NGO
or private); h = 0 otherwise; then these binaries are averaged to create a proportion of the
sick members of the household who visited a formal-sector care facility
• raindays equals the number of days of rainfall at the rainfall station closest to the house-
hold’s sample cluster, in the month and year that the household was surveyed
• histmean of rainfall is the number of days of rainfall in the month of survey averaged over
all years in which rainfall data are recorded for that cluster in the particular month
• histsd is calculated as the standard deviation of the historical distribution of days of rain-
fall in the month of survey, across all years in which rainfall data are recorded for that
cluster in the particular month
• histmeansq and histsdsq are smooth polynomials to the second degree in historical mean
days of rainfall and historical standard deviation of days of rainfall, respectively
• raindayslast equals the number of days of rainfall at the rainfall station closest to the
household’s sample cluster, in the month before that in which the household was surveyed
of the same year
• decraindays and decrainfall are categorical variables reporting which decile of the rain
days and rainfall distributions, respectively, the rain in the survey month falls; fixed effects
for each decile are included in all specifications
• noexist is a binary variable which takes value noexist = 1 if neither hospital, health center,
nor dispensary of (government, NGO or private) exists in the community, and noexist = 0
otherwise (Note: for waves in which these data were missing, the values were filled first
using the minimum from the waves in which the data were not missing for that cluster,
and second using the minimum of non-missing values from clusters matched to the same
rain station in the same wave; that is, if a facility of these types ever existed in that cluster
or in very proximate clusters before or after the year in which the data are missing, we
assumed it existed during this wave as well)
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• For the following facilities/attributes (x), we calculate distances as dist(x) = 0 if the fa-
cility/attribute exists in the same village as the household; dist(x) equals the distance to
the nearest such facility/attribute outside the household’s village if one does not exist in
the village (Note: for waves in which these data were missing, the values were filled first
using the mean from the waves in which the data were not missing, and second using
non-missing data from clusters matched to the same rain station in the same wave)
– Hospital
– Health center
– Dispensary
– Daily market
– Periodic market
– Motorable road
– Public transportation
– Secondary school
– Bank
– Post office/telephone booth
• Categorical variables for the quintiles of the distributions of the above defined distances
to hospital, health center, and dispensary were created and included in all specifications
• dist, distsq, and distcub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the minimum
distance to either a hospital, health center, or dispensary
• hhsize, hhsizesq, and hhsizecub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the
number of members of the household
• age1, age2, and age3 are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the mean age of the
respondents in the household
• assets is a categorical variable measuring the value of all assets of the household; fixed
effects for these categorical values are included in all specifications
• adult, kid, male, female, man, woman, boy, and girl reflect the number of members of
the household of each gender, age, and gender/age combination; where adult is defined
age > 15 and kid = adult
• hhadultsick, hhkidsick, hhmalesick, hhfemalesick, hhmansick, hhwomansick, hhboysick,
and hhgirlsick reflect the number of members of the household of each gender, age, and
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gender/age combination who qualified as sick == 1, by the above definition, at the time
of survey
• hhadultnosick, hhkidnosick, hhmalenosick, hhfemalenosick, hhmannosick, hhwomannosick,
hhboynosick, and hhgirlnosick reflect the number of members of the household of each
gender, age, and gender/age combination who qualified as sick == 0, by the above defi-
nition, at the time of survey
• hhsick, hhsicksq, and hhsickcub are smooth polynomials up to the third degree in the
number of members of the household who qualified as sick == 1
• educ is the maximum value within the household of a categorical variable for how much
education the respondents have completed; fixed effects for each of these values are in-
cluded in all specifications
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Household-Year Observations:
with at least one sick and one non-sick member
with no sick members
Proportion of Sick Household Members Still Ill 0.416 0.430
Proportion of Sick Household Members Visited Formal Healthcare (normalized) 0.615 0.999
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Time use per member of household (hours in week before survey)
Total Labor 29.567 20.922 29.037 18.361 34.246 18.611
     Farm 13.597 12.663 13.465 10.956 15.991 12.014
          Employment 2.481 8.259 2.637 7.538 4.073 10.004
          Field and Herd 10.925 10.222 10.670 9.165 11.727 8.787
          Processing 0.191 1.113 0.159 0.797 0.191 0.960
     Non-farm 15.970 16.033 15.572 14.780 18.255 14.203
          Self-employment 3.114 12.385 3.376 12.376 3.504 11.863
          Home 12.857 10.535 12.196 8.751 14.751 8.279
               Care 0.803 3.291 0.866 2.903 0.855 3.958
Mean SD
Costs of Healthcare
# of days of rain in month of survey 8.249 5.125
No health facility in community 0.651 0.477
Resources in Community
Daily market 0.564 0.496
Periodic market 0.369 0.483
Motorable road 0.972 0.164
Public transport 0.326 0.469
Secondary school 0.117 0.322
Bank 0.112 0.315
Post office/telephone booth 0.143 0.350
Demographic Characteristics
Age 33.442 14.858
Household size 3.561 1.996
No. of Female Members 1.867 1.304
Household assets (Deciles) 4.427 2.833
2.334
1.623
2.833
0.205
0.447
0.324
0.315
0.337
9.202
(households with at least one sick and one 
non-sick member)
No Sick 
MembersSick Members
Non-Sick 
Members
(households with no 
sick members)
Mean SD
7.998
0.627
0.605
0.339
0.956
0.275
Table I: Summary Statistics
2146
1049
0.119
0.112
5.298
0.484
0.489
0.474
Notes: Sample used in analysis is made up of households with at least one member with illness that began in the two weeks prior to survey.  
Summary Statistics of Variables of Interest in Sick and Non-Sick Samples
0.130
28.022
5.134
2.702
5.141
Main Effects
All Controls
Interactions of Resource 
Dummies and Days of 
Rainfall
No Controls No Rain Interactions
Days of Rainfall x No Facility -0.0579*** -0.0566*** -0.0288***
(0.0147) (0.0139) (0.00965)
No Facility -0.0872 -0.137 -0.0557 -0.507***
(0.271) (0.281) (0.280) (0.0806)
Days of Rainfall 0.0960* 0.0846 0.0524 0.00294
(0.0532) (0.0513) (0.0501) (0.0115)
Observations 1932 1995 1995 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.615
F-test: Rain x Distance=0 15.56 16.50 8.903
Prob>F 0.000135 8.73e-05 0.00345
First Stage
Interaction of Rain and Distance to Health Facility on Proportion Visiting Formal Healthcare
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Standard errors are clustered at the sampling cluster by year level.  All specifications inlcude main effects of 
days of rainfall and "No Facility," assets, highest eduction in household, district, rain station, and year of survey group effects; as well as polynomials up to a third degree in average age 
in household, third degree polynomials of no. of household sick and household size, and distance to nearest health facility if one does not exist in community. Specifications also include 
decilies of days of rainfall and levels of rainfall as well as for how long ago the illness started; and quintiles for distance to nearest hospital, healthcare facility, and dispensary.  Dummies 
for the existence of a daily market, periodic market, motorable road, public transport, secondary school, bank and post office/telephone are included; along with interactions of these 
dummies with days of rainfall. Other  controls include historical means and standard deviations of both rainfall and quadratic terms of these; days of rainfall in month prior to survey 
and its interaction with "No Facility;" and gender/age composition of the household. All samples in the analyses, unless otherwise stated, are restricted to households with at least one 
member with an illness that began in the two weeks prior to survey and at least one member that did not report such an illness.  
Table II: First Stage and Robustness Checks
Second Stage IV OLS
Formal Healthcare -0.200** -0.0330***
(0.0992) (0.0122)
Observations 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.416 0.416
Table III: Health Outcomes
Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Still Ill
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. 
Formal Healthcare -1.726 8.675** -10.40**
(5.095) (4.240) (4.215)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.57 13.60 15.97
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table IV: Labor Supply of Houshold Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Total Labor Hours Farm Labor
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Sick
Non-Farm Labor
Formal Healthcare -5.286 4.082 -9.368**
(3.883) (2.938) (4.093)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.04 13.47 15.57
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
Table V: Labor Supply of Houshold Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Non-Sick
Total Labor Hours Farm Labor
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Non-Farm Labor
Formal Healthcare -2.747 4.962* -7.709**
(3.261) (2.641) (3.008)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.42 13.53 15.89
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table VI: Household Labor Supply
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Household Labor Supply Per Capita
Total Labor Hours Farm Labor
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Non-Farm Labor
Employment Field and Herd Processing Self-Employment Home
Formal Healthcare 2.802 5.712** 0.161 -8.211** -2.190
(3.100) (2.745) (0.231) (3.616) (2.733)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.481 10.92 0.191 3.114 12.86
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Farm Labor
Table VII: Components of Labor Supply of Houshold Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Non-Farm Labor
Employment Field and Herd Processing Self-Employment Home
Formal Healthcare 2.502 1.647 -0.0676 -6.479* -2.889
(1.666) (2.727) (0.176) (3.642) (1.969)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.637 10.67 0.159 3.376 12.20
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.
 Farm Labor
Table VIII: Components of Labor Supply of Houshold Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Labor Per Capita of Household Non-Sick
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Non-Farm Labor
Employment Field and Herd Processing Self-Employment Home
Formal Healthcare 2.021 2.906 0.0352 -6.615** -1.094
(1.276) (2.470) (0.160) (2.575) (1.318)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.577 10.78 0.170 3.354 12.54
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Farm Labor
Table IX: Components of Household Labor Supply
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Household Labor Supply Per Capita
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Non-Farm Labor
Formal Healthcare -0.216 0.183 0.224*
(0.135) (0.122) (0.135)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.535 0.278 0.169
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table X: Farm Activity of Household Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Sick in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance 
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)
Land Preperation & 
Planting
Harvesting & 
Marketing
Formal Healthcare -0.189* 0.0215 0.184
(0.113) (0.0904) (0.112)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.502 0.256 0.162
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table XI: Farm Activity of Household Non-Sick
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household Non-Sick in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance 
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)
Land Preperation & 
Planting
Harvesting & 
Marketing
Formal Healthcare -0.198* 0.123 0.209*
(0.107) (0.0953) (0.115)
Observations 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.514 0.265 0.164
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table XII: Household Farm Activity
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Household in Farm Activities
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member)
Crop Maintenance 
(Weeding, Pruning, etc.)
Land Preperation & 
Planting
Harvesting & 
Marketing
Child x Formal Healthcare -0.0880 -0.304 0.716
(0.791) (0.565) (1.261)
Formal Healthcare 1.035* 1.100* 0.772 0.887 0.528 0.394
(0.564) (0.611) (0.558) (0.644) (0.708) (0.693)
Observations 1932 1932 1599 1599 1598 1598
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.866 0.866 0.568 0.568 1.144 1.144
Table XIII: Care Hours of Household Non-Sick Males and Females
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice on Hours Per Capita Spent Caring for Ill
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. Samples are restricted as noted.
Total Male Female
(at least one sick and one non-
sick member)
(at least one sick member and 
one non-sick male)
(at least one sick member and 
one non-sick female)
Chronic 
Fever
Chronic 
Weight Loss
Chronic 
Rash
Chronic 
Fever
Chronic 
Weight Loss
Chronic Rash
Chronic 
Fever
Chronic 
Weight Loss
Chronic Rash
Formal Healthcare 0.0522 -0.101 0.0464
(0.0346) (0.0688) (0.0493)
Days of Rainfall x No Facility -0.00302 0.00584 -0.00269 -0.00424 0.00265 -0.00518
(0.00195) (0.00376) (0.00263) (0.00285) (0.00388) (0.00408)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 906 906 906
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.208 0.107 0.0478 0.0435 0.116 0.0515 0.0435 0.116 0.0515
Table XIV: Health Spillovers
Effects of Healthcare Choice on Proportion of Non-Sick Members Reporting Chronic Illness
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. 
Second Stage IV Reduced Form FalsificationReduced Form
(Households with at least one sick member and one non-sick member) (Households with no sick members)
1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick 
Productive Member
1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick 
Productive Male
1 Sick, 1 Non-Sick 
Productive Female
No Sick 
Days of Rainfall x No Facility -0.00238 -0.00349 -0.00174 0.00341
(0.00491) (0.00488) (0.00497) (0.00504)
No Facility 0.169 0.0818 0.124 -0.111
(0.137) (0.117) (0.134) (0.135)
Days of Rainfall -0.0163 -0.0352** -0.0283 0.0168
(0.0202) (0.0168) (0.0192) (0.0227)
Observations 2960 2960 2960 2960
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.641 0.529 0.529 0.311
F-test: Instrument = 0 0.236 0.511 0.123 0.458
Prob>F 0.628 0.476 0.726 0.500
Table A.1: Selection Checks
Relationship Between Instrument and Selection into Various Samples
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Dependent variables are binaries for whether the household is included in each sample. See 
Table II for other notes.
 No Facility
Daily Market -0.126***
(0.0147)
Periodic Market 0.0753***
(0.0153)
Motorable Road -0.196***
(0.0365)
Public Transportation -0.0418**
(0.0188)
Secondary School -0.179***
(0.0229)
Bank -0.0534**
(0.0254)
Post or Public Telephone -0.618***
(0.0241)
Observations 3383
R-Squared 0.324
Table A.2: Partial Correlations of Access Variables
Regression of No Health Facility in Community on Presence of Other Resources
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments. 
Total
Self-Employment 
Total
Home Total
Days of Rainfall x No Facility -0.0624 -0.00712 -0.0552 -0.176 0.121
(0.394) (0.265) (0.314) (0.298) (0.124)
Observations 906 906 906 906 906
Mean of Dependent Variable 34.25 15.99 18.26 3.504 14.75
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  See Table II for additional comments. Sample is restricted to households with no 
b    ll  h  b   h   k    
Table A.3: Labor Supply of Households with No Sick Members
Reduced Form Effects of Intrument on Labor of Households with No Sick Members
Total Labor 
Hours
Farm Labor
Non-Farm Labor
Total
Self-Employment 
Total
Home Total
Male x Formal Healthcare -10.53** -0.747 -9.785*** 2.576 -12.36***
(5.277) (3.784) (3.751) (2.687) (2.814)
Formal Healthcare 3.488 8.834** -5.346 -9.377** 4.031
(6.391) (4.225) (4.773) (3.813) (3.025)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.57 13.60 15.97 3.114 12.86
Male x Formal Healthcare 8.052** -1.774 9.826*** -0.511 10.34***
(3.474) (2.375) (3.034) (2.120) (2.189)
Formal Healthcare -9.186** 4.894 -14.08*** -6.081* -7.999***
(3.955) (3.174) (4.431) (3.659) (2.114)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.04 13.47 15.57 3.376 12.20
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Effects on Labor Supply of Sick Household Members
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Household Members
Total Labor Hours Farm Labor
Table A.4: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses to Sickness Across Genders
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Males and Females on Labor Per Capita of Household
Non-Farm Labor
Total
Self-Employment 
Total
Home Total
Child x Formal Healthcare -14.05** -6.321** -7.728 -6.310 -1.418
(5.741) (2.866) (5.248) (4.491) (2.614)
Formal Healthcare 0.951 9.680** -8.730** -6.783* -1.947
(5.429) (4.439) (4.252) (3.483) (2.853)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.57 13.60 15.97 3.114 12.86
Child x Formal Healthcare 4.383 3.639 0.744 1.667 -0.923
(4.141) (3.010) (3.314) (2.876) (2.125)
Formal Healthcare -6.172 3.252 -9.423** -6.828* -2.596
(3.964) (2.760) (4.152) (3.587) (1.977)
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.04 13.47 15.57 3.376 12.20
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Household Members
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table A.5: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses to Sickness Across Age
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Children and Adults on Labor Per Capita of Household
Total Labor 
Hours
Farm Labor
Non-Farm Labor
Effects on Labor Supply of Sick Household Members
Total
Self-Employment 
Total
Home Total
Male x Formal Healthcare 0.0164 -5.504* 5.520 1.988 3.533*
(4.369) (3.322) (3.635) (3.321) (1.944)
Formal Healthcare -6.376 5.295 -11.67** -7.806 -3.865**
(5.617) (3.926) (5.506) (5.229) (1.802)
Observations 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599
Mean of Dependent Variable 26.75 15.02 11.73 4.631 7.097
Male x Formal Healthcare 5.333 0.982 4.351 0.427 3.924*
(4.203) (2.513) (2.681) (1.527) (2.237)
Formal Healthcare -5.117 2.806 -7.922* -4.745 -3.177
(5.208) (2.960) (4.451) (3.360) (2.748)
Observations 1598 1598 1598 1598 1598
Mean of Dependent Variable 30.67 12.05 18.62 1.878 16.74
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Female Household Members
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table A.6: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses of Non-Sick Males and Females
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Males and Females on Non-Sick Male and Female Labor
Total Labor Hours Farm Labor
Non-Farm Labor
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Male Household Members
Total
Self-Employment 
Total
Home Total
Child x Formal Healthcare -0.823 -1.510 0.687 -0.376 1.064
(4.563) (2.584) (3.726) (0.939) (3.223)
Formal Healthcare -7.925 1.251 -9.176* -2.209* -6.967*
(5.892) (3.462) (4.963) (1.335) (4.171)
Observations 1244 1244 1244 1244 1244
Mean of Dependent Variable 17.67 6.834 10.83 0.123 10.71
Child x Formal Healthcare -1.895 1.719 -3.614 -2.181 -1.433
(4.826) (3.429) (4.392) (4.166) (2.329)
Formal Healthcare -4.452 4.732* -9.184** -8.374* -0.810
(4.485) (2.861) (4.538) (4.287) (1.910)
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1818
Mean of Dependent Variable 34.10 16.61 17.49 4.791 12.70
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Adult Household Members
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). See Table II for additional comments.  
Table A.7: Heterogeneous Labor Supply Responses of Non-Sick Children and Adults
Second Stage IV: Effects of Healthcare Choice Amongst Sick Children and Adults on Non-Sick Child and Adult Labor
Total Labor 
Hours
Farm Labor
Non-Farm Labor
Effects on Labor Supply of Non-Sick Child Household Members
